Salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay. These agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices, influence the timing of customer purchases, and vary effort over their firms' fiscal years. This paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents' focusing on performance over the fiscal year. Most notably, in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle, manufacturing firms' sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year, and lower at the beginning, than they are in the middle. Further evidence is found in fiscal-year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal-year effects.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fiscal year is an important unit of operation for most American companies because budgeting and financial reporting conform to fiscal calendars. The fiscal year is also the unit of time over which many bonus and compensation schemes are measured. Executive bonus plans are commonly based on fiscal-year results, and many sales compensation plans include a discrete bonus for meeting a sales quota during the fiscal year. 1 These pay schemes provide incentives for managers and salespeople to manipulate prices and timing of business to maximize their own incomes, rather than their firms' profits.
The effects of such agency issues are measured below by exploiting variation in fiscal year ends. Although most firms choose the calendar year as their fiscal year, over a third of fiscal years end between January and November. Because of this variation, I can separately identify the calendar and fiscal-year seasonality of revenue and prices. I find that fiscal-year timing influences the seasonality of business in most manufacturing industries. Explanations for the existence of fiscal-year effects center on decisions made by managers or salespeople. Incentive contracts for managers and salespeople typically involve a nonlinear relationship between compensation and sales (or between compensation and profits). Salespeople usually have an annual sales quota, for which they receive a discrete bonus, while executives often do not receive a bonus until profits reach a minimum threshold. Seeking to reach their annual revenue or profit quota, salespeople and managers may influence business seasonality by adjusting their effort levels and manipulating the timing of sales. 2 In this paper I discuss how incentive contracts may cause these employees to vary their effort throughout the year. I then develop an explicit model of salesperson (or executive) behavior under a quota, focusing on the ability of some salespeople (such as those who work closely with customers over a long buying cycle) to influence the timing of customer purchases. This framework implies that the optimal actions of salespeople and executives lead to higher end-of-year revenues for all firms with nonlinear incentive contracts, and that fiscal-year seasonality is amplified in firms where salespeople and executives can affect the date of customer purchases.
To motivate this analysis of incentives and fiscal-year effects, consider the two graphs in Figure I . Each displays 1985 Each displays -1992 revenue for a pair of competing firms. The horizontal axis represents the calendar quarter, and the vertical axis is the relevant quarter's sales as a percentage of the last four quarters' sales. The paired companies have different fiscal year ends, and the circled and squared observations signify fourth fiscal quarters. Because the pair of companies in each graph are direct competitors, one would expect the same calendar seasonality in the markets for their respective products. This seems to be true for the two consumer goods vendors in the lower graph. But the computer manufacturers in the top graph show a marked increase in sales in their respective fourth fiscal quarters. At these companies each sale requires considerable time and close customer contact. Therefore, the computer salespeople and their managers can more directly influence the timing of sales than their consumer goods counterparts. This may account for the difference in the importance of fiscal years.
I expand on the interindustry variation in fiscal-year effects that Figure I suggests by analyzing the impact of agents' incentive contracts on fiscal-year seasonality. I relate industry fiscal-year effects to the type of product sold, the type of customers and the channels used to reach them, and characteristics of salespeople.
FIGURE I Fiscal-Year Seasonality
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The results are consistent with theoretical predictions of the behavior of agents who face nonlinear incentive contracts and, therefore, identify these agents as previously unrecognized instruments in macroeconomic cycles and seasonal volatility in the stock market. The paper also suggests that incentives undermine attempts to smooth production, while potentially locking successful salespeople into their jobs through the end of the fiscal year.
Section II explains why sales force and managerial incentive contracts may be linked to firm seasonality. It documents the prevalence of contracts with a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and the compensation of salespeople and managers, shows that such incentive plans can lead these employees to take actions that affect firm seasonality, and concludes with a theoretical model of how salespeople and executives manipulate the timing of sales. Section III empirically establishes results consistent with agents' focusing on performance over the fiscal year. It measures the effect of fiscal year ends on revenue and price seasonality, both at an aggregate and industry level, and examines the determinants of interindustry variation in fiscal-year effects. Section IV considers alternative hypotheses for fiscal-year patterns, focusing on the possibility that fiscal years reflect firm-specific seasonality. Section V concludes and suggests directions for future research.
II. EXECUTIVES, SALESPEOPLE, AND INCENTIVES TO MANIPULATE SALES TIMING
II.A. Sales and Managerial Contracts
While most workers are paid a fixed wage, salespeople and executives typically have incentive compensation plans because their ''output'' is relatively measurable and their goals are well defined. These compensation plans tend to specify a nonlinear relationship between revenues and compensation. Such nonlinearities can lead employees to consider not just the absolute level of sales revenue, but the timing of revenue as well.
A common form of executive bonus pays a fixed percentage of profits above some minimum threshold (and sometimes below a maximum). See Figure II for an example. Healy [1985] focused on accounting accrual patterns in showing that bonus plans induce executives to manipulate profit timing. This overlooks executives'
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ability to manipulate profits by affecting the timing of sales revenue. Assuming that marginal costs are roughly constant in the short term, the relationship between sales and compensation is similar to that shown in Figure II , and executives may have incentive to affect revenue timing.
Most salespeople have nonlinearities in their incentive pay, typically involving a quota for the fiscal year. ''Making quota''
FIGURE II Sample Compensation Plans
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often involves a sizable bonus or reward. Like most other sales compensation plans, the example in Figure II includes a discrete bonus for meeting quota, and the commission rate often varies over possible sales outcomes. 3 As will be seen below, the discrete bonus for meeting quota can lead to incentives for salespeople to bunch sales at the end of the fiscal year. 4 In addition to being nonlinear, the pay of top management and salespeople is more variable than most other employees. Although critics argue that executive compensation is not variable enough [Jensen and Murphy 1990] , incentive clauses are a large portion of executive contracts. 5 Most people have had enough experiences with high-pressure sales tactics to believe that salespeople's pay is also relatively variable and based on output. To verify this, I gathered data from the 1984-1988 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP has data on income for each month and therefore provides a measure of within-year income variation. I constructed a data set of salespeople, sales managers, executive/managers, and professionals, with the latter two groups used as a control group of white-collar workers. 6 Appendix 2 establishes that salespeople have the high-3. See Joseph and Kalwani [forthcoming] for a detailed discussion of the prevalence of quota-based sales plans. Their work suggests that Figure II is reasonably representative. Sales compensation plans are typically based on revenues (that is, shipments) rather than orders. This prevents salespeople from booking orders that are subsequently canceled. Note that the bonus associated with meeting quota is not necessarily cash. See Dorsey [1994] for an account of the importance of noncash benefits of reaching quota, and see Cohen [1995] for examples of noncash bonuses.
4. Evidence from several surveys makes it clear that sales quotas are a fixture of sales compensation schemes. Healy [1985] and subsequent work show that bonus plans with a minimum threshold are common for executives. I take quotas or other nonlinearities as given. The question of why these compensation systems are so prevalent is an interesting economic question, but it is beyond the scope of this analysis. One possible explanation for both sales quotas and the executive bonus plans analyzed by Healy [1985] is the principal-agent model in Oyer [1996] . For sales quotas, an alternative explanation put forth by many salespeople and sales managers is that quotas are necessary because people work best when they have goals or competition or both. Camerer et al. [1997] documents the use of goals by self-employed workers, so sales quotas may reflect a system that salespeople prefer. The results in this paper support the claim that internal competition provides effective motivation because otherwise firms could smooth sales by staggering the sales years of their salespeople. However, I could not find any firms that do this.
5. See Hardy [1996] and Peck [1994] for detailed statistics of top executive pay. Also, the voluminous literature on executive compensation has shown that executive pay is sensitive to performance. For example, see Healy [1985] , Murphy [1985] , Haubrich [1994] , and Hall and Liebman [1997] .
6. Note that the ''executive/managers'' category is much broader than top management or the executives surveyed by Forbes. While most management has relatively stable pay compared with that of salespeople, top management at large companies (such as those analyzed in Section III) is a distinct exception. See Oyer [1995] for further details of levels and variability of pay in the SIPP data set.
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est within-year variation in incomes, followed by sales managers. In addition, consistent with the importance of bonuses (although certainly not conclusive), salespeople are the most likely to have a month in which income is more than 25 percent higher than average monthly income in the year. Again, sales managers are the next most likely.
The SIPP observations confirm that salespeople derive a relatively large portion of their income from incentive pay. In conjunction with the survey evidence in Joseph and Kalwani [forthcoming] (which shows that many salespeople are paid as depicted in Figure II ), this suggests that salespeople have incentives to maximize their incomes by manipulating their output. Similarly, the executive bonus plans described by Healy [1985] (see Figure II ) and the importance of variable pay to CEO compensation suggest that top executives of large corporations also have incentives to manipulate the timing of sales.
There are two main ways in which executives and salespeople can affect their firms' revenue seasonality: by directly influencing customers' purchase timing, and by varying their effort level over the fiscal year. Any salesperson or executive can affect seasonality by varying effort. If a salesperson discounts future compensation, and if his compensation package includes a discrete bonus at the end of the years in which his sales exceed a quota, he will tend to increase effort as the year progresses because the expected return to effort increases during the year. As a result, salespeople with a quota have incentive to work harder as the end of the fiscal year approaches. 7 By the exact same logic, executives whose bonus plans include a minimum threshold have incentive to work harder as the year progresses. This suggests that sales and executive incentives could lead, on average, to revenues increasing as the fiscal year progresses. However, it also suggests that, if sales timing is affected by the fiscal year, then this is not simply the result of price changes. If price fluctuations can fully explain fiscal-revenue variation, then sales and managerial effort variation could be ruled out as a cause of this variation.
7. Of course, once a salesperson reaches his quota, this incentive disappears. However, if the quota is not particularly low, then the salesperson will, on average, increase effort over the course of the year. This is shown more formally in Oyer [1995] . Note that the same effect results from any compensation plan which involves settling up at the end of some predetermined period. So the key effect of effort is determined more by the focus on a discrete time unit (that is, the fiscal year), than by the shape of the output/compensation relationship. Anecdotally, Dorsey [1994] described the following pattern among Xerox salespeople: ''You put up a good front of earnest and strenuous work early in the year. You shot for a not unreasonable budget in January, February, and March. Yet you didn't take it seriously. Few machines got sold.''
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II.B. Agent Behavior under Quotas: ''Timing Gaming''
Consider a company that sells parts to car manufacturers. Car manufacturers are concerned with inventory costs and want to avoid buying materials they never use. Also, they are likely to purchase parts at a contracted price, so threats of future price increases are not an effective way to rush orders. Now consider a company selling complex and expensive computer systems to corporations. The salesperson may be in a position to share or hide information about price and technology changes. Similarly, the executives of the computer company can share or hide information from the public and sometimes even from the salesperson. In this way, unlike agents at the parts company, the computer salesperson and the executives for whom he works can influence the date a computer is purchased and shipped. The computer salesperson has more opportunity to attain quota in current and future years, while computer executives can move sales to the year where they have the most impact on their own compensation.
This timing influence, which I will call ''timing gaming,'' can take two forms. 8 The salesperson can ''pull in'' potential business from the next fiscal year to make quota this year, or the salesperson, knowing he has achieved quota or giving up for the current year, can ''push out'' business to the next year. Without knowing salesperson turnover rates and the form of the sales distribution, it is not possible to determine for sure whether the pull-in or push-out effect dominates. However, the model of timing gaming below implies that the pull-in effect is likely to dominate.
Consider a fiscal year with two fiscal periods, let the sales quota be based on sales over the whole fiscal year, and assume that effort is fixed. The salesperson optimizes expected utility over the current fiscal year (year y) and the next one (year z), where the quota and the bonus are constant over the two years. Thus, he is concerned with four fiscal periods, with respective sales x 1 , . . . , x 4 . To be specific, the salesperson receives a bonus b at the end of year y (i.e., the end of the second fiscal period), if x 1 ϩ x 2 Ն Q*, where 8. The rest of this section considers the case of salespeople manipulating the timing of sales to make their quotas. Most of the arguments and results apply equally well to an executive motivated by a bonus plan with a minimum profit threshold. The exception to this is the discussion of turnover. While executive turnover does affect firms (see Gibbons and Murphy [1992] ), top managers change jobs substantially less often than salespeople, both because top managers leave companies less often than salespeople and because salespeople who stay at the same company often move to new territories or other new jobs.
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Q* Ͻ 2x and x Ͻ ϱ. He receives b at the end of year z (fourth period), if x 3 ϩ x 4 Ն Q*.
After observing x 1 , the salesperson decides how much of the potential business that naturally belongs in period 3 he will try to pull into period 2. In order to pull in business, however, the salesperson offers a price break or otherwise lowers the expected value of the deal by more than the firm's discount factor, ␦. 9 Alternatively, the salesperson may push period 2 business into period 3, lowering the expected value of such sales by ␦. Let be the salesperson's discount factor.
Define to be a summary statistic of the salesperson's optimal pull-in/push-out decision, given x 1 , where ϭ 1 is the ''natural'' level or the level for salespeople who cannot influence the timing of sales. Ͼ 1 indicates that the salesperson is pulling in business from the following period, while Ͻ 1 means he is pushing out business. The distribution of sales in period i(i ϭ 1, . . . , 4) is represented by g(x i 0). In periods 1 and 4, is always equal to 1.
is set by comparing three values. 10 First, let B y (or year y cost/benefit) be the salesperson's expected marginal increase (decrease) in year y bonus payments due to increasing (decreasing) from 1, given x 1 . B y is the expected marginal compensation from the first bit of pulling in. Second, define B zϩ to be the discounted expected marginal increase in year z bonus due to pushing out (note that this is not dependent on x 1 ). Finally, define B zϪ to be the expected marginal decrease in year z bonus payments due to pulling in, and note that B zϪ Ͼ B zϩ . If this did not hold, period 2 would be the ''natural'' place for some of period 3's sales.
The salesperson will follow these decision rules: a) Pull in potential sales from year z (i.e., increase above 1) if Figure III illustrates an example. The horizontal axis reflects realized first-fiscal-period sales, and the vertical axis measures the cost/benefit functions. As the figure shows, for quotas that are not extreme, the pull-in region includes the most likely first-9. Many salespeople do not have direct authority over pricing. However, even salespeople who need management approval for discounts can use private information to convince management that a price break is necessary.
10. See Oyer [1995] for calculations of the cost/benefit functions and proofs of the claims in this section.
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period sales outcomes. Therefore, if the pull-in penalty is not too large, or if the salesperson is shortsighted, the pull-in effect will dominate the push-out effect. 11 One factor that is likely to make the salesperson discount heavily (and to significantly affect the relative importance of the two effects) is salesperson turnover. If the salesperson thinks he may leave his territory at the end of the fiscal year, is reduced because the value of future sales in the region is lower for the salesperson. This decreases both B zϪ and B zϩ , so that the pull-in region gets larger and the push-out region gets smaller. Since salespeople turn over regularly, 12 there is likely to be strong motivation for pulling in sales. 13 This model of salesperson timing gaming generates the empirical implication that the magnitude of fiscal-revenue spikes 11. This model also implies that the ''reasonable'' quotas, which lead to the pull-in effect dominating, are a likely outcome because they induce minimal salesperson gaming. (See Oyer [1995] for details.) This is just an economic justification for the rule of thumb found throughout the sales management trade press that salespeople are best motivated by quotas that are not overly simple or difficult to achieve. For example, according to Cohen [1995] , a key to sales incentives is, ''Realistic yet challenging goals should be set.'' Another way to minimize gaming is to add a linear commission to compensation. Commissions are a disincentive to pulling-in and pushing-out because they increase the returns to leaving sales in their ''natural'' period. Referring to Figure III , introducing a commission raises the top horizontal line more than it raises the curve, which is, in turn, raised by more than the lower horizontal line.
12. For example, the salespeople in the SIPP sample (see Appendix 2) average 20.2 percent annual turnover. This is an underestimate of relevant salesperson turnover because it does not include salespeople who leave their sales territory but stay at the same company.
13. Any loss of efficiency caused by turnover-related pulling-in is not a result of the quota/bonus plan, since any plan with variable compensation can lead to FIGURE III ''Timing Gaming'' in a Two-Year, Two-Fiscal-Period Model
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and dips will vary with salespeople's ability to influence the timing of transactions. This will be tested in subsection III.D by using measures of salespeople's and executives' ability to employ timing gaming to explain the variation in sales revenue over the course of firms' fiscal years.
III. FISCAL-YEAR EFFECTS ON REVENUE SEASONALITY
III.A. Methodology and Data
In this section I exploit variation in fiscal year ends to separately identify calendar and fiscal-year effects on revenue seasonality. ''Fiscal-revenue effects'' are the variation in sales that a company can expect at different points in its fiscal year, holding the calendar seasonality of its business constant.
Consider the firms within a single industry. Let s it represent the natural logarithm of firm i's dollar sales in time period t. I assume that sales in a given t may be affected by the calendar period m and by the firm's fiscal quarter q. 14 Therefore, log sales can be expressed as
where a i represents a firm fixed effect, g i is the mean per-period growth of firm i, c m is the industrywide calendar seasonality effect of month m, f q is the industrywide effect of being in fiscal quarter q. The d terms are indicator variables for fiscal quarters and calendar months. The noise term it may have a unit root if shocks to a firm's growth rate are permanent. To eliminate the firm fixed-effect and the unit root in the error term, I estimate the sales regression in first differences, where
Although the firm level growth term remains, it will not bias the calendar and fiscal effects in a balanced panel and can be considered part of the noise term in the estimation. maximum pulling-in by those leaving a sales territory. However, turnover will not affect the seasonality of the firm's revenues under a commission plan since the pulling-in will not be related to the fiscal year. 14. For example, if firm A's fiscal year ends in December, and firm B's ends in June, then for the quarter from October to December, firm A has q ϭ 4, and firm B has q ϭ 2.
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The coefficient of interest is f q , the ''fiscal-revenue effect'' in quarter q. I assume that the fiscal effects are the same in fiscal quarters 2 and 3 and use these as the base quarters. When estimating (2), f 4 measures the amount by which the log of sales changes, holding the industry's calendar seasonality constant, from the third fiscal quarter to the fourth. Similarly, Ϫf 1 reflects the change in log sales from the first to the second fiscal quarter, and f 1 Ϫ f 4 is the change in log sales from the fourth fiscal quarter to the next year's first fiscal quarter. f 1 and f 4 can also be thought of as approximately the percentage by which revenues in the first and fourth fiscal quarters, respectively, differ from fiscal quarters 2 and 3.
The data are from the Standard and Poor's Compustat 1994 Quarterly Industrial file and cover firms' 1985 to 1993 fiscal years. The data are quarterly observations of firm revenue, 15 cost of goods sold (see subsection II.C), fiscal year end, and four-digit SIC code. A total of 31,936 quarterly observations are available, covering 981 manufacturers. Three-digit Census classifications and two-digit SIC codes were determined from the four-digit SIC code. 16 Mean and median quarterly sales are $730.9 million and $106.5 million, respectively. Appendix 1 shows, for each threedigit code, the number of companies and observations, percentage of observations with December fiscal year end, and average quarterly sales.
As shown in Table I , the likelihood of a fiscal year ending in a particular month varies by industry. 17 The paper industry, for example, does not have the fiscal-year-end variation that is critical to the identification of fiscal-revenue effects. A two-, three-, or four-digit industry classification had to meet the following requirements to be included in the empirical analysis: 1) Not more than 80 percent of the firms in the industry have a December fiscal year end. This excluded 19 industries and 258 companies from the three-digit analysis.
15. I use the terms revenue and sales interchangeably. Accounting standards demand that reported quarterly revenues represent shipments to unaffiliated customers. Sales to subsidiaries and orders that are not yet filled do not count as sales revenue.
16. I deviate from two-digit SIC codes in separating Consumer and Industrial Chemicals. This follows Peck [1982] and is based on the premise that selling industrial chemicals differs from selling soap and pharmaceuticals.
17. See Huberman and Kandel [1989] for a detailed analysis of fiscal year ends by firm size and industry. See subsection IV.B below for further discussion of how the choice of fiscal year ends affects the analysis of fiscal effects.
2) Data are available for at least five companies. This excluded 13 industries and 32 companies from the threedigit analysis. Sixteen two-digit industries, thirty-seven three-digit industries, and fifty-one four-digit industries meet these criteria and are included in the analysis below. 18 Table IIa shows the results of estimating equation (2) without fiscal quarter controls (column (1)), with first and fourth fiscal quarter indicator variables (column (2)), and with first and fourth fiscal quarter indicators interacted with a set of three-digit industry indicators (column (3)). All three regressions include 18. Industries also had to include at least three different fiscal year ends and had to have at least one company with a fiscal year end between March and September. However, these restrictions did not exclude any two-or three-digit industries. Two four-digit industries were excluded by the three fiscal year ends rule and no four-digit industries were excluded by the March to September restriction.
III.B. The Effect of Fiscal Years on Revenue Seasonality
These restrictions have arbitrary cutoff points. But the results are not sensitive to where they are set, except in that standard errors fluctuate as the sample size changes. calendar month indicators interacted with three-digit industry indicators, thereby allowing for different calendar seasonality by industry. 19 The average firm has 4.8 percent lower sales in the first fiscal quarter, and 2.7 percent higher sales in the fourth fiscal quarter, than it does in the second or third quarter (see column (2)). Both coefficients are highly statistically significant, indicating that firms' fiscal timing has an effect on seasonality.
19. The growth rate is autocorrelated due to cyclical business, and the average shocks differ across firms, so estimation of (2) leads to autocorrelated and heteroskedastic error terms that cannot be approximated by an AR(1) or other simple format. Therefore, although the OLS estimates of the fiscal and calendar coefficients in equation (2) are consistent and unbiased, the standard errors must be adjusted. Newey and West [1987] develop a method of estimating a variancecovariance matrix that does not require i.i.d. error terms. I use their methodology and weighting algorithm, where necessary, allowing for five lags to contribute to the variance-covariance matrix.
Note that the calendar effects could vary by year due to changes in seasonality or the business cycle. I ran the regressions in Table IIa adding controls for calendar quarter by year, but I could not reject that the calendar effects are equal in all years. (1) (2) (3) The sample consists of all available manufacturing firms. Three-digit industry Census classifications were determined from Compustat four-digit SIC codes. All firms in a given three-digit industry were dropped from the sample if the industry failed to meet either of two criteria: 1) not more than 80 percent of the firms in the industry have December as their fiscal year ends, and 2) the sample contains at least five firms in the industry. Each regression includes changes in indicator variables for the interaction of each calender month and each three-digit industry. Column (2) includes change in indicator variables for first fiscal quarter and fourth fiscal quarter. Column (3) includes change in indicator variables of the interaction of each three-digit industry with each of the first and fourth fiscal quarters. The coefficients and standard errors from the column (3) fiscal quarter/industry interaction terms are reported in Table IIb . Sales are deflated by the CPI. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and for serial correlation over four quarters.
The industry-level fiscal effects, which are included in column (3) of Table IIa and displayed in Table IIb , vary considerably across industries. The ''first quarter dip'' and ''fourth quarter spike'' are insignificant in a few industries such as pharmaceuticals (industry 181) and grain (industry 110), while the dip and spike are Ϫ6.4 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively, in computers (industry 322). The F-statistic testing whether the additional regressors in column (3) are jointly significant is 7.99, so the null hypothesis that the fiscal effects are the same in all industries can be rejected at the 1 percent level.
Though clearly not conclusive proof, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that salespeople and managers influence firm seasonality in response to their incentive contracts. The increase in sales as the fiscal year progresses, which shows up across industries (Table IIa, column (2)), could be a reflection of agents increasing their effort as the incentive payout gets closer. Also, the variation among industries in how much the fiscal year affects revenue seasonality (Table IIa, column (3)) is consistent with salespeople and managers in different industries having varying amounts of influence over sales timing. The next two subsections further investigate the relationship between agent contracts and fiscal-year timing, while Section IV considers alternative hypotheses.
III.C. Fiscal-Year Effects on Price
This subsection aims to determine whether the fiscal effects in subsection III.B are due to price changes and whether price changes are used to manipulate the timing of business. If fiscalyear price patterns can fully explain fiscal-revenue effects, then fiscal-revenue effects are not driven by effort variation of agents within the firm. I will show below, however, that price changes can partially, but not fully, explain fiscal-revenue effects. This suggests that salespeople and executives may well be varying their effort over the course of the fiscal year and that these agents appear to be using prices to influence the timing of customer purchases.
Fiscal-price effects can be measured empirically, despite the fact that price data are not available, by using Compustat cost data to infer relative changes in price. ''Cost of Goods Sold'' (COGS) includes the costs of materials, direct labor, and production overhead. By using COGS to measure output, I can proxy for the change in prices with ⌬ln(Sales) Ϫ ⌬ln(COGS). 20 I use this measure as the dependent variable in regressions similar to those used above to measure fiscal-revenue effects. The explanatory variables are changes in indicator variables for calendar month (which capture the effect of seasonality on both price and cost) and, of more importance for this analysis, fiscal quarter. 21 The coefficients in column (2) of Table IIIa are the fiscal-price effects, measured for all industries together, where the fiscal-price effect is the percentage by which a typical firm's price in fiscal quarter q differs from fiscal quarter 2 or 3. The average firm's fourth fiscal quarter price is 1.7 percent lower, and its first quarter price 0.7 percent higher, than its second or third quarter price. Both of these coefficients are statistically significant at any reasonable level. Together with the results in subsection II.C, this indicates that, on the margin and on average, customers are flexible enough about the timing of purchases to make short-term demand elastic. This is because revenues are lower (higher) in quarters where prices are higher (lower).
Column (3) of Table IIIa adds fiscal quarter indicator variables by three-digit industry. As reported in Table IIIb , the fiscal effects on price differ by industry. The F-statistic for the addition of industry-specific fiscal effects (that is, for moving from column (2) to column (3) of Table IIIa ) is 2.45, which indicates that equality of the fiscal effects across industries can be rejected at the 1 percent level. 22 20. Note that Sales t ϭ Price t *Volume t and COGS t ϭ (Unit COGS) t *Volume t . Therefore, ⌬ln(Sales) t Ϫ ⌬ln(COGS) t ϭ ⌬ln(Price) t Ϫ ⌬ln(Unit COGS) t . Assuming that unit COGS are orthogonal to the fiscal period, changes in ⌬ln(Sales) Ϫ ⌬ln(COGS) over the course of the fiscal year can be attributed to price changes. For materials and direct labor, the assumption that COGS are unaffected by the fiscal year seems reasonable since these unit costs should not change much as a result of relatively small changes in volume. The overhead allocation, however, may be correlated with unit volume at firms that update their overhead rates more often than annually. That is, if a firm applies a constant overhead rate over the course of a fiscal year, then unit costs should be unchanged between quarters even if there are volume changes. But if a firm sets its overhead rate quarterly by dividing manufacturing costs by quarterly unit volume, then quarters with relatively low volume will appear to have low gross margins. This potential bias will be considered when interpreting the empirical results below.
21. As in subsection III.B, homoskedastic and serially independent errors can be rejected, so the Newey-West standard error methodology is used.
22. As discussed above, fiscal-price effects could be biased due to overhead cost allocation. However, the previous section showed that firms have higher sales volume in the fourth quarter, and lower volume in the first quarter. Therefore, firms that revise their overhead rates quarterly will tend to have higher (lower) costs in the first (fourth) quarter. This could lead to an underestimation (overestimation) of the first (fourth) quarter price effect, so the actual fiscal-price effects
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The results in Tables IIIa and IIIb indicate that executives and salespeople set prices differently over the course of the fiscal year and that this contributes to fiscal-year revenue patterns. However, the first quarter fiscal-revenue effect is of a larger magnitude than the fourth quarter fiscal-revenue effect, while the opposite is true of fiscal-price effects. This implies that, if fiscalrevenue effects are solely due to price changes, demand is far more elastic during companies' first fiscal quarter than during the fourth fiscal quarter. Additionally, for the first quarter fiscalrevenue effect to be fully attributable to first quarter price increases, the price elasticity of demand would have to be approximately negative seven. This suggests that someone within firms is using more than just price to drive revenue seasonality. 23 Since price changes are the primary tool many salespeople and executives have to influence their customers' purchase timing, but may be larger in magnitude than those in Tables IIIa and IIIb, but should  maintain the same sign. 23. The industry-level fiscal-price and revenue effects are uncorrelated. This is probably partially due to differences in price elasticities of demand across industries. However, it is also consistent with the claim that something other than price is driving fiscal-year revenue seasonality. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in the log sales minus log cost of goods sold. If direct costs per unit of output are orthogonal to the fiscal year end, then the fiscal year variables in this table approximate the percentage by which average prices in the first or fourth fiscal quarter differ from the second and third fiscal quarters, while controlling for calendar effects on cost and price. The sample, sample restrictions, industry classifications, and calendar month controls are the same as in Table IIa . There are fewer observations than Table IIa because cost of goods sold was not available for all firm-quarters. The coefficients and standard errors from the column (3) fiscal quarter/industry interaction terms are reported in Table IIIb . Sales and cost of goods sold are deflated by the CPI. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and for serial correlation over four quarters. price changes cannot fully explain fiscal-revenue patterns, it appears that agents, on average, increase their effort as the fiscal year progresses.
III.D. Evidence on Incentives and the Timing of Sales
Why do prices change throughout the fiscal year? And why do the fiscal-revenue effects measured in subsection III.B vary substantially from one industry to the next? This subsection addresses these questions and attempts to link salespeople or managers or both more directly with fiscal seasonality by looking for factors that influence the interindustry variation in fiscalrevenue effects. I also try to explain the interindustry variation in fiscal-price spikes and dips, although for descriptive purposes only. Because price manipulation is influenced by price elasticity of demand, and this elasticity may or may not be related to the ability to influence purchase timing, timing influence need not be related to fiscal-price effects.
To explain fiscal-revenue and price effects, I run second-stage regressions where the fiscal effects measured in subsections II.B and II.C are the dependent variable. Data limitations and an inability to control for all endogenous variables, such as specifics of compensation plans, lead to a risk of omitted variable bias, measurement error, and imperfect measures of the ability to employ timing gaming. Therefore, the goal is to see whether the data are consistent with the timing gaming model and to see whether there is reason to believe that there is a link between agents' incentive plans and the timing of business. This analysis is not meant to determine the optimal compensation plan, to estimate structural behavioral parameters, or even to establish an indisputable causal relationship between incentive contracts and fiscal-year effects. Explanatory variables, their sources, and a brief discussion of how they relate to this analysis follow. 1) An indicator variable for durable goods industries. This variable is determined by Census Department classifications. Durable goods are purchased infrequently and are a relatively large investment. This provides the salesperson with discretion to influence the timing of sales. It also makes it more likely that upper management will get directly involved and have the opportunity to influence the purchase date and price. I expect more dramatic fiscal-revenue effects at durable goods manufacturers.
2) The percentage of industry shipments by customer type. This comes from the 1987 Census of Manufacturers. Indirect sales are defined as those to retail and wholesale customers, while direct sales are to manufacturers, the government, or other nonmanufacturers. The timing of sales to manufacturers may be particularly hard to manipulate because they do not want excess raw materials. Government and nonmanufacturer purchases, on the other hand, involve direct customer contact, which provides opportunities to influence purchase timing. Indirect channels have contradictory opportunities for timing influence: cereal sales to supermarkets, for example, are limited to shelf space availability, but many wholesalers and retailers can be induced to take on inventory temporarily (sometimes known as ''stuffing the channel''). So the predicted effect of indirect sales is ambiguous.
3) The industry average annual sales force turnover rates. This variable is calculated from the SIPP data described in Appendix 2. In conjunction with the salesperson characteristics below, it is aimed at isolating the influence of salespeople from that of other agents. I anticipate that higher salesperson turnover leads to bigger fiscal-revenue effects because those salespeople who are leaving a sales district have incentive to pull in as much business as possible.
4) Industry averages of sales force income and education. These data, which are described in Appendix 2, are from the 1990 Census. I expect companies that give their salespeople more discretion over timing and price to employ better trained and higher priced salespeople. This would lead to bigger fiscal effects in industries with better educated and better paid salespeople.
The dependent variables in Tables IV and V are the regression coefficients estimated in subsections II.B and II.C, respectively. In the case of three-digit classifications, these coefficients are listed in Tables IIb and IIIb . The equation to be estimated is
where f jq is the fiscal-revenue or price effect for industry j in quarter q, x jq is a vector of characteristics for industry j interacted with a quarter q indicator variable, and e jq accounts for measurement error and randomness. As Hanushek [1974] showed, (3) can be estimated efficiently through Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS). The weighting matrix is the portion of the An observation is a manufacturing industry. The dependent variable is the industry fiscal-revenue effect for the first or fourth fiscal quarter. The three-digit coefficients (columns (4)-(6)) are detailed in Table IIb . Each explanatory variable is interacted with indicator variables for the first or fourth fiscal quarters. (The regressions cannot be run separately for each quarter's effects while using Hanushek's [1974] methodology.) Classification as durable or nondurable is based on Compustat four-digit SIC code and Census Bureau definitions of durable industries. Data for customer channels are from the 1987 Census of Manufacturers. ''Direct'' includes manufacturing, other nonmanufacturing, and government. Retail and wholesale are considered indirect customer channels. ''Turnover,'' ''Education,'' and ''Earnings'' are averages for salespeople in the industry, calculated from the 1984-1988 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Turnover is average annual turnover rate of salespeople. Education is years of completed education. Earnings is the log of the average annual salesperson income. The omitted customer type in column (3) is manufacturer. Each regression is weighted by the relevant portion of the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the first-stage regression.
variance-covariance matrix from the estimates in column (3) of Tables IIa and IIIa which correspond to the f jq 's in (3). 24 The second-stage regressions can be run on the two-, three-, 24 . In order to use the Hanushek methodology and the variance-covariance matrix from the first-stage regression (which simultaneously estimates the first An observation is a manufacturing industry. The dependent variable is the industry fiscal-price effect for the first or fourth fiscal quarter. The three-digit coefficients (columns (4)-(6)) are detailed in Table IIIb . Each explanatory variable is interacted with indicator variables for the first or fourth fiscal quarters. (The regressions cannot be run separately for each quarter's effects while using Hanushek's [1974] methodology.) Explanatory variables and omitted categories are the same as in Table IV . Each regression is weighted by the relevant portion of the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the first-stage regression.
or four-digit coefficients from fiscal-revenue regressions, depending on the reliability of the regressors. Finer industry definitions are preferred because they lead to more data and to companies within an industry being more similar. However, the SIPP and the Census do not categorize industries at the four-digit level and the SIPP has small sample sizes at the three-digit level, making some three-and four-digit analysis impractical.
In the case of the durable goods indicator and the distribution channels, four-digit is the appropriate level of detail because the data are accurately measured to this level. As shown in Table IV , the ''fourth quarter spike'' is significantly affected by the indicator for durable goods and by distribution channels. Companies selling durable goods have larger fourth quarter spikes than those selling nondurable goods. In addition, those selling direct to customers have larger fourth quarter spikes than those selling through indirect channels. Column (3) of Table IV , which uses a more specific definition of distribution channels, indicates that products sold directly to nonmanufacturers are particularly likely to be sold in the fourth fiscal quarter. This is as expected because these products are not being sold to resellers and they are not being used as raw materials, so the buyers are flexible about timing. The negative and marginally significant coefficients on retail and wholesale in the first quarter imply that channel stuffing may lead to slow indirect sales as the year begins.
There is some evidence that salespeople play an important role in determining fiscal-revenue effects, but the results are not significant. Higher turnover may lead to larger fourth quarter spikes ( p-value ϭ 0.18). As mentioned above, the turnover rates are measured with some error, which may indicate that the result in Table IV is understated. A better measure of turnover, preferably at the four-digit SIC level, is required to make a strong connection to salespeople. The salesperson demographic characteristics are also weakly consistent with the sales quota model. Column (6) of Table IV indicates that fiscal-revenue effects may be more pronounced in industries where salespeople are better paid ( p-value ϭ 0.17).
As Table V shows, sales force characteristics influence fiscalprice effects. Higher salesperson turnover is associated with larger fourth quarter price declines. Perhaps customers who and fourth quarter fiscal-year effects), the first and fourth quarter second-stage estimates have to be combined into a single regression.
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expect salesperson turnover press for discounts at the end of the salesperson's fiscal year. Although not significant in a three-digit regression (see columns (4) and (5) of Table V) , turnover significantly affects price in a two-digit regression. Also, average salesperson education has a significant effect on fourth fiscal quarter price. 25 Industries with better educated salespeople drop their prices more in the fourth quarter. This may reflect the need for better educated salespeople when giving salespeople pricing authority. Alternatively, it could be a result of better educated salespeople having bigger bonuses at stake and therefore having more incentive to make their quotas, although this contradicts the noneffect of education on fiscal-revenue patterns in Table IV .
IV. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR FISCAL-YEAR EFFECTS
The previous section showed that the fiscal year affects the seasonality of revenue and pricing at manufacturing firms and provides evidence that this may be related to the incentive contracts of agents within the firm. However, the evidence on the link between incentive contracts and fiscal-year effects is circumstantial, and further research is needed to prove the existence of a causal relationship. This section further investigates the roots of fiscal-year patterns by considering alternative hypotheses for the results in Section III. I focus on the possibility that fiscal years are set in response to firm-specific seasonality, but I also consider the effects of accounting audit timing.
While the calendar seasonality of a firm is likely to be driven largely by customer demand, the fiscal year end of a company is irrelevant to its customers. 26 Therefore, the fiscal-year effects in Section III are the result of decisions made within producing firms, or at least are driven by customer expectations of how the 25. Note that the three-digit education and earnings variables, which are based on the 1990 Census, are not as subject to turnover, which is based on the SIPP, to measurement error because they are derived from a much bigger sample.
26. Customer fiscal year ends influence seasonality because organizations tend to make capital expenditures near the end of fiscal years (see Callen, Livnat, and Ryan [1996] ). This is controlled for by the calendar seasonality of the industry (that is, c m in equation (2)), unless the fiscal year ends of customers and producers are related. The firms in my sample are large, so a given firm's customers are likely to span the possible fiscal year ends. (An obvious exception is military contractors. However, this is not an issue since there is no variation in customer fiscal year end.) Some firms pick their original fiscal year ends because of a particularly large customer and never change the fiscal year as that customer becomes less important. The fiscal-year-end variation of such firms is exogenous for purposes of the analysis in this paper.
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producing firms will react to their fiscal seasonality. An important decision made by producing firms, which has not been discussed so far, is the setting of the fiscal year end.
Fiscal year ends are not determined exogenously. If fiscal year ends are chosen to coincide with a firm's busy season or to be before a slow period, then fiscal-year effects may be due to seasonality in a firm's business causing the choice of fiscal year end. This section uses several methods to test the possibility that fiscal-revenue effects merely reflect firm-specific demand patterns. The first test is to see how fiscal-revenue effects change as the level of industry aggregation changes. I then measure the seasonality effects of exogenous changes in fiscal year, which sometimes result from corporate mergers. Finally, I look more specifically at how firms choose fiscal years and at the rare occasions where firms choose to change their fiscal years.
The first test of the causal relationship between fiscal year ends and fiscal-revenue effects involves measuring how the fiscalrevenue effects change when controlling for finer levels of industry classification. If fiscal years are chosen to end in a busy season and start in a slow season, then estimates of the fiscal quarter effects would be smaller when controlling for calendar seasonality by specific industry classifications than when controlling for calendar seasonality at a more aggregated industry level. That is, as the firms in an industry classification become more similar, the calendar effects would also become more similar, and the fiscal effects would become weaker. However, Table VI (which uses a subsample that meets the criteria in subsection III.B for all three industry classifications) shows that fiscal-revenue effects do not appear to be simply a result of firm-specific calendar seasonality because the fiscal effects do not change significantly as the level of industry aggregation changes. In fact, as shown in the first column, the fiscal-revenue effects are not changed much when there is no control for calendar seasonality whatsoever. This suggests that industry seasonality is nearly orthogonal to firm fiscal years and that, at least in those industries which meet subsection III.B's selection criteria, fiscal years are not generally chosen based on demand seasonality.
IV.A. Mergers and Acquisitions: Exogenous Shocks to the Fiscal Year
Another test of whether fiscal years cause fiscal seasonality is to see how firms' seasonal sales patterns evolve when their fiscal
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years are changed exogenously. Such exogenous changes happen regularly in the form of corporate takeovers. Few takeovers can be analyzed, however, because the fiscal year has to change by a multiple of three months, the relative sales of that part of the company which changes its fiscal year has to be substantial, and the firm cannot sell off assets upon executing the takeover. Two acquisitions that met these criteria took place in 1986. 27 In the first, Unisys was formed by the merger of Sperry and Burroughs, two computer companies of roughly equal size. Before the merger, Burroughs had a calendar fiscal year, while Sperry's ended in March. After the merger, Unisys adopted a calendar fiscal year. In the second example, General Foods, whose fiscal year had ended in March, was acquired by Philip Morris, which used a calendar fiscal year both before and after the acquisition.
27. I searched the Wall Street Journal Index ''acquisitions'' section for [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . These were the only two acquisitions or mergers I found that met the necessary criteria. See notes to Table IIa for details about the regressions. In all columns the first two rows are the coefficients on the change in indicator variables for first fiscal quarter and fourth fiscal quarter. All industry classifications were determined from Compustat four-digit SIC codes. Except column (1), the samples meets the selection criteria (see notes to Table IIb or subsection III.A) for two-digit, three-digit, and four-digit classifications. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and for serial correlation over four lagged quarters. Table VII shows the change in calendar seasonality of Unisys and Philip Morris following the mergers. If fiscal years cause revenue seasonality, then the changes in fiscal years after the acquisitions should have the following three effects on Unisys' and Philip Morris' seasonality:
1) The coefficient on the first calendar quarter indicator variable will decrease after the merger. This is because the first calendar quarter will no longer be the fourth fiscal quarter for part of the company, but will instead be the entire postmerger company's first fiscal quarter.
2) The coefficient on the fourth calendar quarter indicator variable will increase because the fourth quarter represents the entire postmerger company's fourth fiscal quarter.
3) The coefficient on the second calendar quarter indicator variable will increase because it is no longer the first fiscal quarter for part of the company.
Column (1) of Table VII shows that all of these effects occur in the Unisys case, although the change in the second quarter is insignificant. Simply by changing its fiscal year, the seasonality of the Sperry portion of Unisys changed. At Philip Morris, as shown in column (2) of Table VII, two of the three expected changes in In 1986, Sperry (March fiscal year end) and Burroughs (December fiscal year end) merged to form Unisys (December fiscal year end). In 1986, General Foods (March fiscal year end) was purchased by Philip Morris (December fiscal year end). The merged company has a December fiscal year end. An observation is sales of the company during a postmerger calendar quarter or combined sales of the two companies during a premerger calendar quarter. The omitted category is the third calendar quarter, because it is never the first or fourth fiscal quarter of any of the companies. These regressions also include change in first, second, and fourth calendar indicators as explanatory variables. The data set includes fiscal years 1980-1993. fiscal seasonality took place at the time of the merger. The coefficients on the fourth and second calendar quarter indicator variables increased, but the first calendar quarter coefficient also increased. This suggests that other changes in seasonality affected at least the first calendar quarter or that fiscal effects are not as important in General Foods' business as they are in Sperry's.
IV.B. Choice of Fiscal Year End and Changes in Fiscal Year Ends
While the two previous subsections provide evidence that fiscal year ends can be considered exogenous for the purposes of Section III, it is worth considering further how firms choose their fiscal year ends and why some but not all industries have fiscal-year-end variation. There is no strong unifying characteristic that describes the industries in which December fiscal year ends dominate. I investigated the possibility that fiscal year concentration resulted from firm size (as Huberman and Kandel's [1989] analysis suggests it might). I also considered the possibility that fiscal year ends would be more concentrated in industries with a higher intensity of calendar seasonality (as measured by summing the calendar coefficients from a regression similar to those in subsection III.B). But neither average firm size nor level of calendar seasonality is significantly correlated with the percentage of firms with December fiscal year ends.
Some industries have an operational reason for firms to focus on a single fiscal year end. Retail stores tend to have January fiscal year ends, for example, because that is the best time to do the annual physical inventory. However, such industries are dropped from the analysis in Section III, because a criterion for inclusion in the regression is that an industry not have more than 80 percent of firms with the same fiscal year end. It appears that in industries where there is not a reason to choose a single fiscal year, most firms choose a calendar fiscal year and others may choose a different fiscal year end. 28 But, for purposes of this paper, the fiscal years in such industries can be considered exogenous.
28. If salesperson effort and gaming is indeed a primary cause of fiscalrevenue effects, it may be the case that an industry's level of fiscal-year variation depends on the competitive sales environment. That is, in industries where the return to salesperson effort is highest during busy periods, firms would all choose to end their fiscal years when demand is strongest. Other industries may have an equilibrium where firms want their salespeople pushing hardest for business when their competitors' salespeople are not.
Further evidence on the choice of fiscal year end can be gained by examining companies that change their fiscal year end. Perhaps the best evidence that fiscal year ends cause fiscal-year effects, rather than the other way around, is the rarity of fiscal year end changes at established firms. From 1985-1994 I was able to identify only one fiscal-year-end change at an American Fortune 500 manufacturer where the change was not related to an acquisition. 29 If fiscal year ends were strategically chosen to coincide with firms' busy seasons, and if doing so brought firms any substantial advantages, then many firms would change their fiscal year end as their product mix and customer base developed. Instead, though a firm may optimally choose its fiscal year end early in its existence, as its business changes but its fiscal year end remains stable, the fiscal year end becomes less related to its business and more of a historical accident.
Changes in fiscal year end are clearly not exogenous. However, by looking at revenue seasonality only within a few years of the fiscal-year change, and by excluding those companies whose fiscal-year changes reflected changes in their fundamental business, analyzing the effects of fiscal-year-end changes has the potential to add further insight into the roots of fiscal-revenue effects. Among manufacturers, 395 fiscal-year-end changes are identified in the 1985-1994 Compustat annual full coverage file. Only 209 of these changes (representing 197 companies) were by a multiple of three months, which is a necessary condition for identifying the change in quarterly seasonality. Compustat quarterly data were available for 139 of these companies (covering 147 fiscal-year changes) at the time they switched fiscal year ends.
Manufacturers that change their fiscal year ends tend to be small. Seven of the 139 changes took place at companies that had no sales. Another 34 were at companies with quarterly sales of less than one million dollars. Mean and median quarterly sales, at the time of fiscal-year change, were $109.5 and $6.2 million, respectively. Fiscal-year changes spanned 73 three-digit industry categories fairly evenly, with the exception of concentrations in the pharmaceutical (16 percent of changes) and dental instrument (5 percent) industries. The pharmaceuticals companies were 29. James River Corporation, a paper company, changed its fiscal year end from April to December in 1990. Even if this indicates that there is a strategic reason to have a calendar fiscal year in the paper industry, the analysis in Section III is not affected because 88 percent of paper companies have a calendar fiscal year.
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largely small biotechnology companies that had gone public to raise money, but were not generating sales revenue in a manner relevant to this analysis.
To analyze the effect of fiscal-year changes, companies were dropped that did not have at least eight quarterly observations before and after the fiscal-year-end change. American Depository Receipts were dropped because some of these companies did not report quarterly figures, and, even for those who do, the change in fiscal year end does not necessarily reflect any change in the fiscal year of the foreign parent. 30 Quarterly observations were dropped if they were more than four years from the change in order to focus on the change in seasonality most related to the fiscal-year change. Quarters with sales under $2.5 million were also dropped, so that the sample would more closely resemble the larger sample used in Section III. In order to eliminate restructuring-related fiscal-year changes (such as those due to bankruptcy, merger, or asset sales), firms were dropped if they had negative net worth at the time of the fiscal-year-end change, if they had a year-to-year log sales increase of more than one, or if they had a year-to-year log sales decrease of more than 0.5. This left thirteen firms.
The fiscal-year effects are then identified by the change in seasonality that companies experienced when they changed fiscal year ends. As seen in Table VIII , the fiscal-year effects are similar to those for the larger sample (see Table IIa ), though not as significant. 31 While the fiscal-year changes measured in Table  VIII are not exogenous, the results are consistent with changes in fiscal year ends leading to changes in fiscal-revenue seasonality. Collectively, Tables VI-VIII, the rarity with which fiscal years change, and the patterns in fiscal-year choice by industry support the view that fiscal year ends cause the fiscal seasonality measured in Table IIa and that fiscal-revenue effects are not merely the result of firms selecting their fiscal year ends to coincide with their busy season.
30. Several Israeli companies that are listed on American stock exchanges switched their fiscal year ends in 1986-1988 due to changes in Israeli tax law. This provides a potential set of companies with an exogenous change in fiscal year end. However, the hyperinflation of the Israeli shekel and the dramatic vacillation in the dollar-shekel exchange rate make this analysis impossible when using the dollar-denominated financial reports of these companies.
31. The coefficients in Table VIII are sensitive to the sample selection rules, although the signs of the coefficients are consistent for any reasonably restricted sample.
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IV.C. Audit Timing
One potential problem with relying on quarterly accounting data is that, while end-of-year statements are only released after an external accounting audit, the results of the first three fiscal quarters are typically not audited. If firms release conservative unaudited statements in order to insure that there will not be any negative adjustments, then it could be the case that fourth quarter revenue, on average, includes sales that really took place earlier in the year.
However, while audit timing could be contributing to the fourth quarter fiscal-revenue effect, the other fiscal-year patterns do not appear to result from auditing. For example, audit timing would not imply that first quarter revenue should be particularly low, as Table IIa suggests. Also, if firms were systematically conservative in their first three quarters, then they would overstate their costs. This would make it appear that firm's profit margins increase (or, based on the assumptions in subsection III.C, that prices increase) in the fourth fiscal quarter. But subsection III.C and Table IIIa show the reverse pattern.
Finally, the importance of auditing may vary by industry, and if audit timing were the cause of fiscal-revenue effects, there could be interindustry variation in fiscal-year effects. However, it is not clear why the effects of auditing on fiscal-year timing should be correlated with the durability of a product, the sales channels through which it is sold, or any of the other explanatory variables The sample consists of American-based manufacturing firms that changed their fiscal year ends. All included companies met the following criteria: 1) at least two years of quarterly data were available before and after the change in fiscal year; 2) the fiscal year changed by a multiple of three months, 3) quarterly sales for all included quarters were at least $2.5 million, 4) net worth was positive at the time the fiscal year changed; and 5) log sales did not increase by more than one or decrease by more than 0.5 in the year following the fiscal-year change. Sales are deflated by the CPI. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and for serial correlation.
in subsection III.D. These inconsistencies suggest that, while audit timing could contribute to the fourth quarter fiscal-revenue effect, it is unlikely to be a primary determinant of fiscal-year revenue and price patterns, or the way these patterns vary by industry.
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This paper used variation in company fiscal years to show that revenue seasonality in many manufacturing industries is affected by fiscal timing. This is partially a pricing issue because prices tend to drop in peak fiscal quarters and increase in slow quarters. However, price changes cannot explain all the fiscalrevenue seasonality.
The patterns in fiscal spikes and in the interindustry variation of fiscal-year effects are consistent with agents reacting to nonlinear incentive plans. The clearest link is that business tends to be stronger (weaker) at the end (beginning) of a fiscal year than in the middle of a fiscal year. The large fiscal effects in durable goods industries, and industries where products are sold through certain sales channels, provide further evidence that incentives are behind fiscal effects.
The results, while consistent with upper management and salespeople affecting fiscal seasonality, do not prove that agents are the main cause of fiscal-year effects, nor do they make a clear distinction between the roles of managers and salespeople. A potentially informative line of future research would be to use sales data from within companies. This would allow analysis of how sales vary with salespeople's position relative to quota and throughout the fiscal year. 32 Another potential direct test of the effect of sales incentives is suggested by the experience of PeopleSoft Inc., a software company with a calendar fiscal year. According to a Goldman Sachs research report [Sherlund 1995] , ''PeopleSoft changed its sales force year end from December to March . . . there is a strong incentive to close business in the March quarter. We expect a bit slower bookings in the June quarter as a result.'' One can imagine PeopleSoft being part of a ''natural experiment'' of the effect of sales incentives on business seasonality. However, this is the only case I have identified where a firm's fiscal and sales year ends differ.
32. Asch [1990] documents the quota/fiscal effects link by showing that military recruiters with an annual quota are more productive toward the end of the year. However, the recruiters' lack of financial incentive limits the applicability to sales representatives.
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The importance of fiscal-year effects can be researched in many areas of economics. Because fiscal year ends are bunched, they may explain some of the macroeconomic seasonality discussed by Barsky and Miron [1989] . A crude approximation, based on the R 2 in the Table IIa regressions, suggests that fiscal-year timing can explain about a quarter of the seasonal variation in business revenues. Also, fiscal effects are probably an important factor in the additional variance in stock prices upon the announcement of fourth quarter earnings [Beaver 1968 ].
But perhaps the most interesting path for future research is to consider fiscal effects' implications for the generally accepted fact that firms, and especially manufacturers, benefit from smooth production. If this is the case, why do manufacturers employ compensation plans that add unnatural seasonality and how big must the benefits of nonlinear compensation systems be to justify the revenue spikes they create? Perhaps this question can be addressed by researching the relationship (either at a company or industry level) between the costs of production bunching and the shape of sales and managerial incentive contracts. An observation in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) sample, except the annual turnover measure, is a job-year where the person stayed in the same job. One person can account for up to two observations. The calculation of annual turnover is based on all reported jobs in the appropriate category. Turnover is defined as leaving the firm. An observation in the Census sample is anyone who reports a job as a salesperson or sales manager. ''Monthly standard deviation'' is the within-year standard deviation of the log of monthly earnings. ''Spike'' is the percent of observations with at least one month where earnings are more than 25 percent greater than the person's average monthly earnings for the year. Census Occupation Codes are Managers-1 through 19, Professionals-37 through 178, Sales managers-243, Salespeople-256 through 259 and 285.
